逻辑学概念的初步规定(42)
大耳朵英语  http://www.bigear.cn  2011-12-12 20:41:23  【打印
§ 42



(a) The Theoretical Faculty. Cognition qua cognition. The specific ground of the categories is declared by the Critical system to lie in the primary identity of the 'I' in thought what Kant calls the 'transcendental unity of self−consciousness'. The impressions from feeling and perception are, if we look to their contents, a multiplicity or miscellany of elements: and the multiplicity is equally conspicuous in their form. For sense is marked by a mutual exclusion of members; and that under two aspects, namely space and time, which, being the forms, that is to say, the universal type of perception, are themselves a priori. This congeries, afforded by sensation and perception, must however be reduced to an identity or primary synthesis. To accomplish this the 'I' brings it in relation to itself and unites it there in one consciousness which Kant calls 'pure apperception'. The specific modes in which the Ego refers to itself the multiplicity of sense are the pure concepts of the understanding, the Categories.



Kant, it is well known, did not put himself to much trouble in discovering the categories. 'I', the unity of selfconsciousness, being quite abstract and completely indeterminate, the question arises, how are we to get at the specialised forms of the 'I', the categories? Fortunately, the common logic offers to our hand an empirical classification of the kinds of judgment. Now, to judge is the same as to think of a determinate object. Hence the various modes of judgment, as enumerated to our hand, provide us with the several categories of thought. To the philosophy of Fichte belongs the great merit of having called attention to the need of exhibiting the necessity of these categories and giving a genuine deduction of them. Fichte ought to have produced at least one effect on the method of logic. One might have expected that the general laws of thought, the usual stock−in−trade of logicians, or the classification of notions, judgments, and syllogisms, would be no longer taken merely from observation and so only empirically treated, but be deduced from thought itself. If thought is to be capable of proving anything at all, if logic must insist upon the necessity of proofs, and if it proposes to teach the theory of demonstration, its first care should be to give a reason for its own subject.



(1) Kant therefore holds that the categories have their source in the 'Ego' and that the 'Ego' consequently supplies the characteristics of universality and necessity. If we observe what we have before us primarily, we may describe it as a congeries or diversity: and in the categories we find the simple points or units, to which this congeries is made to converge. The world of sense is a scene of mutual exclusion: its being is outside itself. That is the fundamental feature of the sensible. 'Now' has no meaning except in reference to a before and a hereafter. Red, in the same way, only subsists by being opposed to yellow and blue. Now this other thing is outside the sensible; which latter is, only in so far as it is not the other, and only in so far as that other is. But thought, or the 'Ego', occupies a position the very reverse of the sensible, with its mutual exclusions, and its being outside itself. The 'I' is the primary identity −− at one with itself and all at home in itself. The word 'I' expresses the mere act of bringing−to−bear−upon−self: and whatever is placed in this unit or focus is affected by it and transformed into it. The 'I' is as it were the crucible and the fire which consumes the loose

plurality of sense and reduces it to unity. This is the process which Kant calls pure apperception in distinction from the common apperception, to which the plurality it receives is a plurality still; whereas pure apperception is rather an act by which the 'I' makes the materials 'mine'.



This view has at least the merit of giving a correct expression to the nature of all consciousness. The tendency of all man's endeavours is to understand the world, to appropriate and subdue it to himself: and to this end the positive reality of the world must be as it were crushed and pounded, in other words, idealised. At the same time we must note that it is not the mere act of our personal self−consciousness which introduces an absolute unity into the variety of sense. Rather, this identity is itself the absolute. The absolute is, as it were, so kind as to leave individual things to their own enjoyment, and it again drives them back to the absolute unity.



(2) Expressions like 'transcendental unity of self−consciousness' have an ugly look about them, and suggest a monster in the background: but their meaning is not so abstruse as it looks. Kant's meaning of transcendental may be gathered by the way he distinguishes it from transcendent. The transcendent may be said to be what steps out beyond the categories of the understanding: a sense in which the term is first employed in mathematics. Thus in geometry you are told to conceive the circumference of a circle as formed of an infinite number of infinitely small straight lines. In other words, characteristics which the understanding holds to be totally different, the straight line and the curve, are expressly invested with identity. Another transcendent of the same kind is the self−consciousness which is identical with itself and infinite in itself, as distinguished from the ordinary consciousness which derives its form and tone from finite materials. That unity of self−consciousness, however, Kant called transcendental only; and he meant thereby that the unity was only in our minds and did not attach to the objects apart from our knowledge of them.



(3) To regard the categories as subjective only, i.e. as a part of ourselves, must seem very odd to the natural mind; and no doubt there is something queer about it. It is quite true however that the categories are not contained in the sensation as it is given us. When, for instance, we look at a piece of sugar, we find it is hard, white, sweet, etc. All these properties we say are united in one object. Now it is this unity that is not found in the sensation. The same thing happens if we conceive two events to stand in the relation of cause and effect. The senses only inform us of the two several occurrences which follow each other in time. But that the one is cause, the other effect −− in other words, the causal nexus between the two −− is not perceived by sense; it is only evident to thought. Still, though the categories, such as unity, or cause and effect, are strictly the property of thought, it by no means follows that they must be ours merely and not also characteristics of the objects. Kant however confines them to the subject−mind, and his philosophy may be styled subjective idealism: for he holds that both the form and the matter of knowledge are supplied by the Ego −− or knowing subject −− the form by our intellectual, the matter by our sentient ego.



So far as regards the content of this subjective idealism, not a word need be wasted. It might perhaps at first sight be imagined, that objects would lose their reality when their unity was transferred to the subject. But neither we nor the objects would have anything to gain by the mere fact that they possessed being.



The main point is not, that they are, but what they are, and whether or not their content is true. It does no good to the things to say merely that they have being. What has being, will also cease to be when time creeps over it. It might also be alleged that subjective idealism tended to promote self−conceit. But surely if a man's world be the sum of his sensible perceptions, he has no reason to be vain of such a world. Laying aside therefore as unimportant this distinction between subjective and objective, we are chiefly interested in knowing what a thing is: i.e. its content, which is no more objective than it is subjective. If mere existence be enough to make objectivity, even a crime is objective: but it is an existence which is nullity at the core, as is definitely made apparent when the day of punishment comes.





  §42



  (A)理论的能力——论知识之所以为知识。



  康德的批判哲学指出,自我在思想中的原始的同一性,(即自我意识的先验的统一性)就是知性概念的特定根据。通过感觉和直观所给予的一些表象,就其内容看来,乃是杂多的东西。而且就其形式看来,就其在感性中的互相外在,在时间和空间两个直观形式中来看,所有一切表象也同样是杂多的东西。虽说空间与时间本身,作为直观的普遍形式,却是先天的。感觉和直观的这种杂多东西,由于自我把它同自己相联系,并且把它联系在一个意识(即纯粹统觉)中,于是便得到同一性或得到一个原始的综合。自我与感觉的杂多事物相联系的各种特定方式就是纯知性概念范畴。



  康德有一个很方便的法门可以发现那些范畴,这是人们很熟知的事。自我,自我意识的统一,既是很抽象,又是完全无规定性的,于是问题便发生了,我们如何得到自我的规定或范畴呢?很幸运的是,在普通逻辑学里,已经根据经验揭示出各种不同的判断了。但判断即是对于一个特定对象的思维。那已经列举出来的各种判断的形式因此也就同时把思维的各种范畴告诉了我们。——费希特的哲学却有一个大的功绩,他促使我们注意到一点:即须揭示出思维范畴的必然性,并主要地推演出范畴的必然性来。——费希特的哲学对于逻辑的方法至少产生了一个效果,就是说,他曾昭示人,一般的思维范畴,或通常的逻辑材料,概念,判断,和推论的种类,均不能只是从事实的观察取得,或只是根据经验去处理,而必须从思维自身推演出来。如果思维能够证明什么东西是真的,如果逻辑要求提出理论证明,如果逻辑是要教人如何证明,那么,逻辑必须首先能够对它自己的特有内容加以证明,并看到它的必然性。



  附释一:康德的主张是说,思维的范畴以自我为其本源,而普遍性与必然性皆出于自我。我们试观察近在眼前的事物,则所得的尽是些杂多的东西,而范畴却是些简单的〔格式〕,这些杂多事实,皆可分别归于其中。感性的事物是互相排斥,互相外在的。这是感性事物所特有的基本性质。譬如说,"现在"只有与过去和将来相联系,才有意义。同样,红之为红,只有与黄和兰相对立才显明。但这个他物乃外在于感性之物,而感性之物之所以存在,只是由于他物存在,并且由于他物与它对立。但思想或自我的情形恰与此相反,无有绝对排斥它或外在于它的对立者。自我是一个原始的同一,自己与自己为一,自己在自己之内。当我说"我"时,我便与我自己发生抽象的联系。凡是与自我的统一性发生关系的事物,都必受自我的感化,或转化成自我之一体。所以,自我俨如一洪炉,一烈火,吞并销熔一切散漫杂多的感官材料,把它们归结为统一体。这就是康德所谓纯粹的统觉(reineapper Aception),以示有别于只是接受复杂材料的普通统觉,与此相反,纯粹统觉则被康德看作是自我化(Vermeinigen)〔外物〕的能动性。



  无疑地,康德这种说法,已正确地道出了所有一切意识的本性了。人的努力,一般讲来,总是趋向于认识世界,同化(anzueignen)并控制世界,好象是在于将世界的实在加以陶铸锻炼,换言之,加以理想化,使符合自己的目的。但同时还须注意,那使感觉的杂多性得到绝对统一的力量,并不是自我意识的主观活动。我们可以说,这个同一性即是绝对,即是真理自身。这绝对一方面好象是很宽大,让杂多的个体事物各从所好,一方面,它又驱使它们返回到绝对的统一。



  附释二:康德所用的名词,如"自我意识的先验统一",看起来好象很严重,就好象那后面藏匿着有什么巨大的怪物似的,但其实,意义却异常简单。康德所说的"先验的"的意义,可从他所划分的"先验的"和"超越的"区别,绎出来。所谓"超越的"是指超出知性的范畴而言,这种意义的用法,最初见于数学里面。譬如,在几何学里,我们必须假定一个圆周的圈线,是由无限多和无限小的直线形成的。在这里,知性认为绝对不相同的概念,直线与曲线,要假设为相同,〔这便是超越知性的看法了〕。这种意义的"超越",那本身无限,自己与自己同一的自我意识,也是有的。因为自我意识有别于〔或超出了〕受有限材料限制的普通意识。但康德认为自我意识的统一只是"先验的",他的意思是说,自我意识的统一只是主观的,而不归属于知识以外的对象自身。



  附释三:认范畴为只是属于我们的,只是主观的,这在自然意识看来,必定觉得很奇怪,无疑地,这种看法确有些欠妥。范畴绝不包含在当前的感觉里,这诚然不错。例如,我们试看一块糖。这块糖是硬的、白的、甜的等等。于是我们说,所有这些特质都统一在一个对象里,但这统一却不在感觉里。同样的道理,当我们认为两件事实彼此间有了因果的关系时,我们这里所感到的,只是两件依时间顺序相连续的个别的事实。至于两件事之中,一件为原因,一件为结果,换言之,两件事的因果联系,都不是感觉到的,而只是出现在我们思维内的。这些范畴,如统一性、因果等等,虽说是思维本身的功能,但也决不能因此便说,只是我们的主观的东西,而不又是客观对象本身的规定。但照康德的看法,范畴却只是属于我们的,而不是对象的规定,所以,他的哲学就是主观唯心论,因为他认为自我或能知的主体既供给认识的形式,又供给认识的材料。认识的形式作为能思之我,而认识的材料则作为感觉之我。



  关于康德的主观唯心论的内容,此处毋庸赘述。初看或以为对象的统一性既然属于主体,这样一来,对象岂不失掉实在性了么?如果,只是说,对象有存在,这于对象和主体双方均毫无所得。主要的是要说明对象的内容是否真实。只是说事物的存在,对于事物的"真实性"并无帮助。凡是存在的,必受时间的限制,转瞬可以变为不存在。人们也可以说,主观唯心论足以引起人的自我夸大的心理。但假如他的世界只是一堆感觉印象的聚集体,那么他就没有理由以这种世界自豪。所以,我们最好抛开主观性和客观性的区别,而着重对象内容的真实性,内容作为内容,既是主观的,又是客观的。如果只是〔在时间上〕存在便叫做客观实在,那么,一个犯罪的行为也可说是客观实在,但是犯罪的行为本质上是没有真实存在的,由罪行后来受到惩罚或禁止来看,更足以显得它没有真实的存在。

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