逻辑学概念的初步规定(19n)
大耳朵英语  http://www.bigear.cn  2011-11-24 14:26:43  【打印
§ 19n

(1) The first question is: What is the object of our science? The simplest and most intelligible answer to this question is that Truth is the object of Logic. Truth is a noble word, and the thing is nobler still. So long as man is sound at heart and in spirit, the search for truth must awake all the enthusiasm of his nature. But immediately there steps in the objection −− are we able to know truth ? There seems to be a disproportion between finite beings like ourselves and the truth which is absolute, and doubts suggest themselves whether there is any bridge between the finite and the infinite. God is truth: how shall we know Him? Such an undertaking appears to stand in contradiction with the graces of lowliness and humility. Others who ask whether we can know the truth have a different purpose. They want to justify themselves in living on contented with their petty, finite aims. And humility of this stamp is a poor thing.

But the time is past when people asked: How shall I, a poor worm of the dust, be able to know the truth ? And in its stead we find vanity and conceit: people claim, without any trouble on their part, to breathe the very atmosphere of truth. The young have been flattered into the belief that they possess a natural birthright of moral and religious truth. And in the same strain, those of riper years are declared to be sunk, petrified ossified in falsehood. Youth, say these teachers, sees the bright light of dawn: but the older generation lies in the slough and mire of the common day. They admit that the special sciences are something that certainly ought to be cultivated, but merely as the means to satisfy the needs of outer life. In all this it is not humility which holds back from the knowledge and study of the truth, but a conviction that we are already in full possession of it. And no doubt the young carry with them the hopes of their elder compeers; on them rests the advance of the world and science. But these hopes are set upon the young, only on the condition that, instead of remaining as they are, they undertake the stern labour of mind.

This modesty in truth−seeking has still another phase: and that is the genteel indifference to truth, as we see it in Pilate's conversation with Christ. Pilate asked 'What is truth ?' with the air of a man who had settled accounts with everything long ago, and concluded that nothing particularly matters −− he meant much the same as Solomon when he says: 'All is vanity'. When it comes to this, nothing is left but self−conceit.

The knowledge of the truth meets an additional obstacle in timidity. A slothful mind finds it natural to say: 'Don't let it be supposed that we mean to be in earnest with our philosophy. We shall be glad inter alia to study Logic: but Logic must be sure to leave us as we were before.' People have a feeling that, if thinking passes the ordinary range of our ideas and impressions, it cannot but be on the evil road. They seem to be trusting themselves to a sea on which they will be tossed to and fro by the waves of thought, till at length they again reach the sandbank of this temporal scene, as utterly poor as when they left it. What comes of such a view, we see in the world. It is possible within these limits to gain varied information and many accomplishments, to become a master of official routine, and to be trained for special purposes. But it is quite another thing to educate the spirit for the higher life and to devote our energies to its service. In our own day it may be hoped a longing for something better has sprung up among the young, so that they will not be contented with the mere straw of outer knowledge.

(2) It is universally agreed that thought is the object of Logic. But of thought our estimate may be very mean, or it may be very high. On one hand, people say: 'It is only a thought.' In their view thought is subjective, arbitrary and accidental −− distinguished from the thing itself, from the true and the real. On the other hand, a very high estimate may be formed of thought; when thought alone is held adequate to attain the highest of all things, the nature of God, of which the senses can tell us nothing. God is a spirit, it is said, and must be worshipped in spirit and in truth. But the merely felt and sensible, we admit, is not the spiritual; its heart of hearts is in thought; and only spirit can know spirit. And though it is true that spirit can demean itself as feeling and sense −− as is the case in religion, the mere feeling, as a mode of consciousness, is one thing, and its contents another. Feeling, as feeling, is the general form of the sensuous nature which we have in common

with the brutes. This form, viz. feeling, may possibly seize and appropriate the full organic truth: but the form has no real congruity with its contents. The form of feeling is the lowest in which spiritual truth can be expressed. The world of spiritual existences, God himself, exists in proper truth, only in thought and as thought. If this be so, therefore, thought, far from being a mere thought, is the highest and, in strict accuracy, the sole mode of apprehending the eternal and absolute.

As of thought, so also of the science of thought, a very high or a very low opinion may be formed. Any man, it is supposed, can think without Logic, as he can digest without studying physiology. If he have studied Logic, he thinks afterwards as he did before, perhaps more methodically, but with little alteration. If this were all, and if Logic did no more than make men acquainted with the action of thought as the faculty of comparison and classification, it would produce nothing which had not been done quite as well before. And in point of fact Logic hitherto had no other idea of its duty than this. Yet to be well informed about thought, even as a mere activity of the subject−mind, is honourable and interesting for man. It is in knowing what he is and what he does that man is distinguished from the brutes. But we may take the higher estimate of thought −− as what alone can get really in touch with the supreme and true. In that case, Logic as the science of thought occupies a high ground. If the science of Logic then considers thought in its action and its productions (and thought being no resultless energy produces thoughts and the particular thought required), the theme of Logic is in general the supersensible world, and to deal with that theme is to dwell for a while in that world. Mathematics is concerned with the abstractions of time and space. But these are still the object of sense, although the sensible is abstract and idealised. Thought bids adieu even to this last and abstract sensible: it asserts its own native independence, renounces the field of the external and internal sense, and puts away the interests and inclinations of the individual. When Logic takes this ground, it is a higher science than we are in the habit of supposing.

(3) The necessity of understanding Logic in a deeper sense than as the science of the mere form of thought is enforced by the interests of religion and politics, of law and morality. In earlier days men meant no harm by thinking: they thought away freely and fearlessly. They thought about God, about Nature, and the State; and they felt sure that a knowledge of the truth was obtainable through thought only, and not through the senses or any random ideas or opinions. But while they so thought, the principal ordinances of life began to be seriously affected by their conclusions. Thought deprived existing institutions of their force. Constitutions fell a victim to thought: religion was assailed by thought: firm religious beliefs which had been always looked upon as revelations were undermined, and in many minds the old faith was upset. The Greek philosophers, for example, became antagonists of the old religion, and destroyed its beliefs. Philosophers were accordingly banished or put to death, as revolutionists who had subverted religion and the state, two things which were inseparable. Thought, in short, made itself a power in the real world, and exercised enormous influence. The matter ended by drawing attention to the influence of thought, and its claims were submitted to a more rigorous scrutiny, by which the world professed to find that thought arrogated too much and was unable to perform what it had undertaken It had not −− people said −− learned the real being of God, of Nature and Mind. It had not learned what the truth was. What it had done was to overthrow religion and the state It became urgent therefore to justify thought, with reference to the results it had produced: and it is this examination into the nature of thought and this justification which in recent times has constituted one of the main problems of philosophy.

Thought regarded as an activity.

§ 19n

  附释一:第一问题是:什么是逻辑学的对象?对于这个问题的最简单、最明了的答复是,真理就是逻辑学的对象。真理是一个高尚的名词,而它的实质尤为高尚。只要人的精神和心情是健康的,则真理的追求必会引起他心坎中高度的热忱。但是一说到这里立刻就会有人提出反问道:"究竟我们是否有能力认识真理呢?"在我们这些有限的人与自在自为存在着的真理之间,似乎有一种不调协,自然会引起寻求有限与无限间的桥梁的问题。上帝是真理;但我们如何才能认识他呢?这种知天求真的企图似乎与谦逊和谦虚的美德相违反。但因此又有许多人发出我们是否能够认识真理的疑问,其用意在于为他们留恋于平庸的有限目的的生活作辩解。类似这种的谦卑却毫无可取之处。类似这样的说法:"象我这种尘世的可怜虫,如何能认识真理呢?"可以说是已成过去了。代之而起的另一种诞妄和虚骄,大都自诩以为直接就呼吸于真理之中,而青年人也多为这种空气所鼓舞,竟相信他们一生下来现成地便具有宗教和伦理上的真理。从同样的观点,特别又有人说,所有那些成年人大都堕落、麻木、僵化于虚妄谬误之中。青年人所见的有似朝霞的辉映,而老辈的人则陷于白日的沼泽与泥淖之中。他们承认特殊部门的科学无论如何是应该探讨的,但也单纯把它们认为是达到生活的外在目的的工具。这样一来,则妨碍对于真理的认识与研究的,却不是上面所说的那种卑谦,而是认为已经完全得到真理的自诩与自信了。老辈的人寄托其希望于青年的人,因为青年人应该能够促进这世界和科学。但老辈所属望于青年人的不是望他们停滞不前,自满自诩,而是望他们担负起精神上的严肃的艰苦的工作。

  此外还有一种反对真理的谦逊。这是一种贵族式的对于真理的漠视,有如我们所见得,拜拉特(Pilatus)对于基督所表示的态度。拜拉特问道:"真理是什么东西?"意思是说,一切还不是那么一回事,没有什么东西是有意义的。他的意思颇似梭罗门所说的:一切都是虚幻的——这样一来,便只剩下主观的虚幻了。

  更有一种畏缩也足以阻碍对于真理的认知。大凡心灵懒惰的人每易于这样说:不要那样想,以为我们对于哲学研究是很认真的。我们自然也乐意学一学逻辑,但是学了逻辑之后,我们还不是那样。他们以为当思维超出了日常表象的范围,便会走上魔窟;那就好象任他们自身漂浮在思想的海洋上,为思想自身的波浪所抛来抛去,末了又复回到这无常世界的沙岸,与最初离开此沙岸时一样地毫无所谓,毫无所得。

  这种看法的后果如何,我们在世界中便可看得出来。我们可以学习到许多知识和技能,可以成为循例办公的人员,也可以养成为达到特殊目的的专门技术人员。但人们,培养自己的精神,努力从事于高尚神圣的事业,却完全是另外一回事。

  而且我们可以希望,我们这个时代的青年,内心中似乎激励起一种对于更高尚神圣事物的渴求,而不会仅仅满足于外在知识的草芥了。

  附释二:认思维为逻辑学的对象这一点,是人人所赞同的。但是我们对于思维的估价,可以很低,也可以很高。一方面,我们说:这不过是一个思想罢了。——这里的意思是说,思想只是主观的,任意的,偶然的,而并不是实质本身,并不是真实的和现实的东西。另一方面,我们对于思想,也可以有很高的估价,认为只有思想才能达到至高无上的存在、上帝的性质,而其感官则对上帝毫无所知。我们说,上帝是精神,我们不可离开精神和真理去崇拜上帝。但我们承认,可感觉到的或感性的东西并不是精神的,而精神的内在核心则是思想,并且只有精神才能认识精神。精神诚然也可表现其自身为感觉(例如在宗教里),但感觉的本身,或感觉的方式是一事,而感觉的内容又是另一事。感觉的本身一般是一切感性事物的形式,这是人类与禽兽所共有的。这种感觉的形式也许可以把握最具体的内容,但这种内容却非此种形式所能达到。感觉的形式是达到精神内容的最低级形式。精神的内容,上帝本身,只有在思维中,或作为思维时,才有其真理性。在这种意义下,思想不仅仅是单纯的思想,而且是把握永恒和绝对存在的最高方式,严格说来,是唯一方式。

  对于以思想为对象的科学,也是和思想一样,有很高或很低的估价。有人以为,每个人无须学习逻辑都能思考,正如无须研究生理学,都能消化一样。即使人研究了逻辑之后,他的思想仍不过与前此一样,也许更有方法一些,但也不会有多大的变化。如果逻辑除了使人仅仅熟习于形式思维的活动外,没有别的任务,则逻辑对于我们平时已经同样能够作的思维活动,将不会带来什么新的东西。其实旧日的逻辑也只有这种地位。此外,一方面,对于人来说,思维的知识即使只是单纯的主观活动也是对他很光荣而有兴趣的事。因为人之所以异于禽兽即由于人能知道他是什么,他作什么。而且另一方面,就逻辑作为研究思维的科学来看(思想既是唯一足以体验真理和最高存在的活动),逻辑也会占有很高的地位。所以,如果逻辑科学研究思维的活动和它的产物(而思维并不是没有内容的活动,因为思维能产生思想,而且能产生它所需要的特定思想),那么逻辑科学的内容一般讲来,乃是超感官的世界,而探讨这超感官的世界亦即遨游于超感官的世界。数学研究数和空间的抽象对象。数学上的抽象还是感性的东西,虽然是没有特定存在的抽象的感性东西。思想甚至于进一步"辞别"〔或脱离〕这种最后的感性东西,自由自在,舍弃外的和内的感觉,排斥一切特殊的兴趣和倾向。对于有了这样基础的逻辑学,则我们对于它的估价,当然会较一般人通常对于逻辑的看法为高。

  附释三:认识到比起那单纯形式思维的科学具有更深意义的逻辑学的需要,由于宗教、政治、法律、伦理各方面的兴趣而加强了。从前人们都以为思想是无足重轻,不能为害的,不妨放任于新鲜大胆的思想。他们思考上帝、自然和国家,他们深信只是通过思想,人们就可以认识到真理是什么,不是通过感官,或者通过偶然的表象和意见所能达到。当他们这样思想时,其结果便渐渐严重地影响到生活的最高关系。

传统的典章制度皆因思想的行使而失去了权威。国家的宪章成为思想的牺牲品,宗教受到了思想的打击;许多素来被认作天启的坚固的宗教观念也被思想摧毁了,在许多人心中,传统的宗教信仰根本动摇了。例如在希腊,哲学家起来反对旧式宗教,因而摧毁了旧式宗教的信仰。因此便有哲学家由于摧毁宗教,动摇政治,而被驱逐被处死的事,因为宗教与政治本质上是联系在一起的。这样,思维便在现实世界里成为一种力量,产生异常之大的影响。于是人们才开始注意到思维的威力,进而仔细考察思维的权能,想要发现,思维自诩过甚,未能完成其所担负的工作。思维不但未能认识上帝、自然和精神的本质,总而言之,不但未能认识真理,反而推翻了政府和宗教。因此亟须对于思维的效果或效用,加以辩护,所以考察思维的本性,维护思维的权能,便构成了近代哲学的主要兴趣。

思维被视为一种活动。

文章来源:大耳朵英语--免费实用 http://www.bigear.cn